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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
v.
GEORGE BAKER d/b/a BAKER
CONSTRUCTION,

Docket No. 870168-CA

Defendant-Appellant,
and
GORDON HANSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.
-000O000-

PARTIES
The only parties to this action are those named in the caption,
although Plaintiff-Respondent Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company transacts business as "Mountain Bell."
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(C), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Circuit Court in
a civil action to recover for damages to a telephone cable.
1

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court err in receiving, as the only evidence of
Plaintiff's damages and without proper foundation, a computer-generated
document reflecting computer calculations?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant Baker's motion to
dismiss at the close of Plaintiff's case inasmuch as Plaintiff had presented
no evidence of negligence and no admissible evidence of its damages?
3.

Are the trial court's Findings of negligence on the part of

Appellant supported by any substantial credible evidence or are they clearly
erroneous?
4.

Are the trial court's Findings as to Appellant's damages

supported by any credible evidence or are they clearly erroneous?
5.

Is the trial court's Finding of no negligence on the part of

Defendant-Respondent Hansen supported by any credible evidence or is it
clearly erroneous?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Sections 54-8a-4, 54-8a-6, and 54-8a-8, Utah Code Annotated
(1953 as amended), are relevant to this action.

The computer-generated

exhibit, in light of the foundation offered for it, was inadmissible pursuant
to Rules 804 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
rules are reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-2 - A-6.

2

These statutes and

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
This action was filed by Plaintiff-Respondent on January 6, 1987.
(R. at 1.)

Defendant Baker filed a pro se answer on his own behalf on

February 2, 1987. (R. at 11.) Defendant-Appellant Baker was subsequently
granted leave by the trial court to file a formal Answer and Crossclaim on
March 18, 1987. (R. at 57.) Defendant-Respondent Hansen filed an Answer
to the Crossclaim on March 30, 1987. (R. at 46.)
The matter proceeded to trial before the Circuit Court, sitting
without a jury, on the afternoon of April 3, 1987. The Circuit Court ruled
against Defendant-Appellant Baker on all issues (R. at 176-177), and signed
without alteration Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgments
submitted by counsel for both Plaintiff and Defendant-Respondent Hansen.
(R. at 60 and 66, 61 and 66, and 61 and 67.)

This appeal followed.

(R. at 69.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant George Baker is a licensed contractor.
Friday, November

On

16, 1984, Mr. Baker's company was contacted by

Defendant-Respondent Hansen and informed that Mr. Hansen's sewer line
was backed up and that raw sewage was overflowing in his basement and
running down his gravel driveway.

(R. at 150.)

Mr. Hansen informed

Mr. Baker's company that the situation was an emergency and that he
wanted a backhoe and an operator immediately. (R. at 150.) The Hansen
household consisted of

four

members and it
3

would have been an

impossibility for them to live in their house Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and
into the following week without being able to run water down the drains or
flush any of the toilets.

(R. at 158.)

Mr. Hansen considered the matter

one of great urgency and stayed home from work in order to resolve the
problem. (R. at 158.) Mr. Baker's company offered to send a full crew and
contact the "Blue Stakes" program (R. at 117); however, Mr. Hansen insisted
that he knew where all the utilities were on his property (R. at 117) and
rejected a "full crew," noting that he would do the hand digging
(R. at 150).
When

Roger

Duvall,

the

backhoe

operator

dispatched

to

Mr. Hansen's residence, arrived, he noted that Mr. Hansen had already
excavated and exposed a break in the sewer pipe in the Hansen driveway.
(R. at 132.)

Mr. Duvall checked the pipe by inserting a garden hose and

determined that there was an additional stoppage further down the line.
(R. at 133.)

Mr. Hansen and Mr. Duvall walked down the sewer line and

found another location where raw sewage was bubbling up through the
ground.

(R. at 133.)

Mr. Hansen requested Mr. Duvall to go ahead and

excavate in the vicinity of this second location, agreeing that he would use
the hand shovel himself.

(R. at 135.) Mr. Duvall explained to Mr. Hansen

that he would be digging in front of the backhoe in order to locate the
sewer pipe or any buried utilities and that Mr. Duvall would then scoop dirt
from the trench with the backhoe to the depth of the shovel blade, and
that the process would be repeated. (R. at 135.)
4

In this process, Mr. Duvall discovered, before damaging it, a dark
cylindrical object.

(R. at 138.)

Mr. Duvall asked Mr. Hansen what the

object was and Mr. Hansen inspected it and reported that it was a "tree
root."

(R. at 138.)

At trial, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he had told

Mr. Duvall that the object was a tree root. (R. at 153.) Mr. Duvall again
questioned Mr. Hansen as to what the object was and Mr. Hansen responded
that it was a tree root and to "tear it out.H

(R. at 138.)

Mr. Duvall

proceeded to dislodge the object, became suspicious when he encountered
more resistance than would be expected from a tree root, again stopped the
backhoe to inspect the object, and determined that it was a telephone
cable. (R. at 139.)
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company was called and
repaired the cable.

Both Mr. Hansen and Mr. Baker refused to pay

Mountain States' claim for the damage to the cable.
At trial, Mountain States called two witnesses: an administrative
reports clerk and the supervisor of the repair. Neither witness offered any
testimony of any negligence on the part of the backhoe operator. The only
evidence as to its damages offered by Mountain States, over the objection
of Mr. Baker, was a computer-generated document.

The administrative

reports clerk testified that she had typed in the number of hours reported
by the repair supervisor and that the computer had generated a "bill" for
the repairs.

She admitted that she had no idea as to the actual supplies
5

used, the cost of the tools or supplies used, or the formulas or calculations
used by the computer in generating the "bill."
The trial court overruled Defendant Baker's objection to the
computer-generated "bill," denied his motion to dismiss at the conclusion of
Plaintiff's case even though Plaintiff had presented no evidence of any
negligence, and entered a judgment of no cause of action on his cross-claim
against Defendant-Respondent Hansen.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The only evidence submitted by the Respondent utility in support
of its claim was a computer-generated "bill" prepared by its "claims office."
That document consists almost entirely of amounts calculated, as opposed to
retrieved, by computer. As such, it is hearsay. The foundation laid for the
document was not sufficient to render it admissible under the business
records exception. A Plaintiff in a tort case may not prove its unliquidated
damages

through

the

admission

of

computer-generated

calculations,

particularly where, such as in the present case, the foundation witness is
unable to provide any explanation as to the formulas, calculations, or
methods employed by the computer in generating the document.
While a utility whose facilities

have been damaged

through

negligence is entitled to recover the reasonable and ordinary cost of
repairing those facilities, it is not entitled to prove its damages based upon
average costs or accounting estimates.
6

Moreover, it is entitled to recover

only those indirect overhead expenses proximately related to the defendant's
conduct.
Appellant Baker's motion to dismiss should have been granted
because the Respondent utility failed to offer any evidence of any
negligence on the part of Appellant's backhoe operator and because the
unrefuted evidence at trial demonstrated that an emergency circumstance
existed because raw sewage was flooding Respondent Hansen's basement and
bubbling up through the ground. Utah law does not require that a utility
be notified before excavation is commenced if an emergency exists.

Utah

law imposes a prima facie presumption of evidence only if an excavation is
made without the required notice being given. In this case, notice was not
required because an emergency existed and, moreover, any presumption of
negligence was rebutted by the unrefuted evidence of the care and caution
with which Appellant Baker's employee operated the backhoe.
The trial court also erred in dismissing Appellant Baker's
crossclaim against Respondent Hansen.

It was Respondent Hansen who

insisted that the Blue Stakes program not be contacted and who stated that
he knew where all the utilities on his property were located.

It was

Respondent Hansen who declined Appellant Baker's offer to provide a full
crew, agreeing that he would, instead, do the manual shoveling and act as
"spotter" himself. Moreover, Appellant Baker's backhoe operator located the
communications cable and asked Respondent Hansen what it was before it
was damaged. Respondent Hansen examined the object, reported that it was
7

a tree root, and instructed Defendant Baker's employee to "tear it out."
Only then was the cable damaged.
court

erred

in

dismissing

the

Under these circumstances, the trial

crossclaim

of

Appellant

Baker

against

Respondent Hansen.
ARGUMENT
POINT I, THE COMPUTER CALCULATED "BILL" WAS INADMISSIBLE AND
THERE WAS NO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES.
The only evidence of the damages claimed by Plaintiff in this
action is found in a computer-generated "bill" received over

Defendant's

objection (R. at 94-95) as Exhibit P-l (reproduced infra at A-26).

Such

foundation as was laid for this exhibit was provided by Plaintiff's witness,
Ann Nielsen.

She testified that she was "an administrative reports clerk"

for Plaintiff's "area claims office" and that her work consisted of dealing
with damage claims, investigating the claims, "billing the claims," and
following up on the claims if payment was not received.

(R. at 87.)

She

testified that, in the normal course of her duties, she prepared billings that
were sent out to people whom she "felt caused the damage."

(R. at 88.)

She went on to testify that repair supervisors provided her with what is
called a Form 3886, which lists the number of man hours spent on any
particular repair.

(Exhibit P-2, reproduced infra at A-27.)

She inputs

these hours to a computer and "the computer then gives us a total for the
bill, and then prints the bill."

(R. at 91.)

She was also permitted to

testify, without further foundation, over the objection of Defendant Baker,

8

that the $2,060.33 total reflected on the exhibit represented

w

the actual

costs incurred by Mountain States TelephoneM in connection with the repair
of the cable at issue. (R. at 93.)
Ms. Nielsen acknowledged that she did not know what rate of
pay the employees who repaired the cable at issue received, that she did
not know what supplies were actually used in connection with the repair of
the cable, that she did not know what tools were used on the job, that she
did not know what the tools used had cost, that she did not know whether
Mountain Bell had lost any revenue as a result of the cable being out of
service, that she did not know which customers' service was interrupted
and, generally, that she had no independent knowledge of anything except
the man hours reported, which she had faithfully input to the computer.
(R. at 96-98.)

In fact, the witness's total ignorance of what the document

was, how it was calculated, and what it demonstrated is graphically
manifest by her testimony that "we did not charge for overtime hours."
(R. at 89.) In fact, it was the unrefuted testimony of Plaintiff's employee
who supervised the repairs, Gary Newkirk, that his employees received
"right around $14.00 an hour" regular time and $21.00 per hour overtime.
(R. at 110.) In the exhibit, however, 44 hours are billed at an average rate
of $37.25 per hour, approximately three times the crew's actual regular rate
of pay.

9

A. The Computer-Generated "Bill" is Hearsay and Inadmissible,
It is of critical importance to note, at the outset, a fundamental
distinction with respect to the computer-generated printout at issue in this
case: It does not consist of information retrieved by Plaintiff's computer;
instead, it consists almost entirely of information calculated by Plaintiff's
computer. In other words, the question is not whether Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
is admissible for the purpose of demonstrating that 44 man hours were
worked on this project1, but whether it is admissible for proving the
reasonable value or reasonable cost of those repairs.

While relatively few

cases have dealt directly with the admissibility of computer-generated
calculations
information,

as opposed

to computer-generated

the courts have consistently

printouts of

noted that the

retrieved
foundation

necessary for such calculations is substantially greater than for mere
retrievals.

For example,

in

Illinois

v. Bovio.

118 Ill.App.3d

836,

455 NE.2d 829 (1983), the trial court's admission of computer calculations
was held to be erroneous. On appeal, the Court noted that the foundation
offered

for the calculations did not demonstrate that the computer

Actually, the testimony of Gary Newkirk, who supervised the repairs,
was that he and four other men worked nine overtime hours each and his
time sheet (Exhibit 2) demonstrated that two other individuals worked four
hours each regular time some three days later. While these figures are not
reconcilable with, and are indeed inconsistent with, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1
which reflects 44 overtime hours, Appellant does not contest for the
purposes of this appeal the number of hours worked. The reasonableness of
the hours worked is subject to challenge, particularly in view of the fact
that Mr. Newkirk's nine hours consisted entirely of "supervising" and
procuring coffee, hot food, and other non-essential items. (See. R. at 107.)
10

equipment was standard and that there was little evidence concerning the
method of preparation of the data to attest to its trustworthiness.

The

Court held:
Systems, like the one apparently in question, which
perform calculations must be scrutinized
more
thoroughly than those systems which merely retrieve
information. . . .
No testimony established that the
computer program at the data center was standard,
unmodified, and operated according to its instructions.
On the basis of these gaps in the foundation
requirement, we hold that the trial court erred in
admitting the bank statement in evidence. . . .
455 NE.2d at 833-34 (citations omitted).

In the case presently before this

Court, the foundation offered for Respondent's computer calculations was
even less complete in that the only witness called to offer that foundation
had absolutely no information concerning the nature of the program or the
formulas or rates that it utilized. She knew only that she had typed in the
number of man hours accurately.2 Under these circumstances, the proffered
foundation was totally insufficient.
Similarly, in Illinois v. Morman. 97 Ill.App.3d 556, 422 NE.2d 1065
(1981), the Court placed emphasis upon the fact that a computer printout
consisted merely of information retrieved (as opposed to calculated) by a
2

As noted, the witness's "knowledge" of the accuracy of the data that
she input is highly questionable.
She testified that the computer had
treated all of the hours as regular time although the evidence demonstrated
that the computer treated all of the hours as overtime.
Moreover,
Mr. Newkirk testified that 45 hours of overtime and eight hours of regular
time had been devoted to the project, whereas the computer obviously based
its calculations upon 44 hours of overtime and no regular hours. Such
discrepancies, while mathematically insignificant, demonstrate the lack of
trustworthiness inherent in Respondent's computer operations.
11

car rental company's computer in holding that it was admissible.

In so

holding, the Court noted:
[T]he fact that the Avis computer was used to retrieve
information
rather
than
perform
calculations
necessitates less scrutiny into the nature of the
computer. . . .
422 NE.2d at 1073.
In a case squarely

on point, a utility's

computer-generated

damage calculations were held to be inadmissible to prove the value of
damage to the utility company's facilities in Davton Power & Light Company
v. Hershner, No. 1101 (Ohio Ct. App., filed March 27, 1981).3 In that case,
a motorist negligently collided with a utility pole.
filed suit for damage to its pole.

The utility company

In support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment, the utility submitted an extensive affidavit
supervisor of its accounting department.
"work

order

cost

summaries" similar

by the assistant

Attached to the affidavit were
to

the

computer-generated

received in this case as trial Exhibit 1 but with much more detail.

'bill"
The

affidavit demonstrated that the work order cost summaries were prepared
monthly in the ordinary course of the utility's business and utilized sound
accounting

principles.

The

affidavit

went

on

to

explain

that

the

calculations were based upon the utility's cost experience "over a long
period of time." In ruling that the foundation for these computer-generated
calculations was inadequate, the Court held:
3

This unreported opinion, as retrieved via Lexis, is reproduced infra at

A-7.
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This Court recognizes that in today's business
world, computers and computerized bookkeeping have
become commonplace, and that the business records
exception to the hearsay rule is intended to bring the
realities of the business world into a court of law.
In this case, however, DP&L is attempting to
prove by computer printout its unliquidated damages.
This can be contrasted to the use of computer
printouts to show a liquidated amount due, such as on
an account. Because of the difference between what
the two types of computer printouts are intended to
prove, this Court is not passing on a computer
printout's introduction into evidence pursuant to [the
business records exception] in general. Rather, we
confine ourselves to computer printouts introduced for
the purpose of proving unliquidated damages.
Slip Op., infra at A-9. Having made the fundamental observation that the
proffered evidence consisted of information calculated rather than retrieved
by computer, the Court noted that the foundational affidavit also recited
that the summary had been prepared in the ordinary course of business and
"accurately reflects the cost incurred in the replacement of the pole." The
Court ruled, however, that:
These mere conclusions on
foundation witness that the records
ordinary course of business are
foundation for the printouts'
evidence.

the part of the
were made in the
not a sufficient
introduction into

Specific proof must be presented that the
computer records were made in the ordinary course of
business.
This would include testimony that the
printouts were routinely made rather than specifically
prepared for trial, and that they were relied on by
DP&L as sufficiently accurate for business purposes.
Further, the foundation witness must describe in
detail any calculations or abbreviations appearing in
the printout.
Abbreviations in DP&L's work cost
13

summaries are not explained. In addition, the original
source of the information contained in the printout
must be shown, and the reliability and trustworthiness
of the information must be established.
These
requirements were not met by DP&L in its efforts to
prove unliquidated damages by the work cost
summaries.
Slip Op., infra at A-9-10, emphasis added.

For precisely the same reasons,

the computer-generated calculations that form the sole basis of the damage
evidence in this case are inadmissible.
Ms. Nielsen admitted that she had no information as to how the
calculations were prepared and she candidly acknowledged that they were
prepared solely for the purpose of submitting a bill to those parties
believed by the Respondent to be liable for the damage to its facilities.
Accordingly, the foundation is inadequate both because the only witness
attempting to provide foundation could not explain how the amounts were
calculated or the rates that had been applied to them and her testimony
makes clear that they were prepared solely for the purpose of pursuing a
damage claim and not in the ordinary course of business.

By her own

testimony, Ms. Nielsen lacked the knowledge that would enable her to
provide an adequate foundation.

She did not know what mathematical

manipulations the computer performed, she did not know what rates were
applied, she did not know what factors the computer considered.

Without a

foundation as to the basis of the mathematical calculations performed by
the computer, the dollar figures

resulting from those calculations are

utterly meaningless.
14

While the courts have created no specific rules as to the identity
or occupation of the witness attempting to lay a foundation for computergenerated evidence, the courts have wisely and consistently required that
the individual have reasonably specific knowledge about the basic methods
by which the documents were prepared.

For example, in Monarch Federal

Savings and Loan Association v. Genser. 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475
(1977), the Court was required

to determine

the

sufficiency

foundation for computer-generated mortgage payment records.

of

the

The Court

held:
No specific person must be called to supply the
foundation testimony for the admission of business
records.
However, whoever testifies must be in a
position to supply the foundation [required], i.e., the
regular course of business, the time of making of the
record and the event recorded, the sources of
information recorded, and finally, the methods and
circumstances of the computer record's preparation.
This Court agrees [that] a proper foundation for
(computer) evidence is laid by testimony of a witness
who is familiar with the computerized records and the
methods under which they were made so as to satisfy
the court that the methods, the sources of information,
and the time of preparation render such evidence
trustworthy. Thus, in providing information as to the
methods of preparation, the foundation witness should
also be able Mto testify as to the type of computer
employed, the permanent nature of the record storage,
and how daily processing of information to be fed into
the computer was conducted, resulting in permanent
records." . . .
383 A.2d at 485-86 (citations omitted).

In the case at hand, Ms. Nielsen

was admittedly unable to offer any of this foundation except that she
accurately input information supplied to her by other company records.
15

The fundamental
exceptions set forth
trustworthiness.

principle embodied in each of

in Rule 803 of

the Utah Rules of

the hearsay
Evidence

is

With respect to business records, the theory is that if a

business prepares a record in its ordinary manner before a claim or dispute
has arisen and relies upon that record in its day-to-day operations, then
there is strong practical reason to anticipate that the record will be
reasonably accurate, unbiased, and worthy of credibility.

None of these

crucial factors are shown to be present, however, with respect to the
computer-generated damage calculations proffered by the Respondent as the
only evidence of its damages. Logic demonstrates that the utility has every
reason to make those figures as large as possible.

The "bill" was created

only after the damage had occurred and for the specific purpose of billing
those deemed responsible.

The record was not prepared as part of the

utility's ordinary, on-going billing activities, it was prepared to support and
prove an unliquidated claim. Similarly, there is no evidence that the utility
uses similar records, or the computer program that generates them, for any
independent business purpose other than attempting to recover damage
claims.

Accordingly, the concept of trustworthiness which is central to the

"business record exception" is entirely lacking with respect to Exhibit 1.
The trustworthiness of materials offered as business records on
the basis of the business records exception has frequently been held by
courts to justify the admission of documents (when demonstrated) or to
require the refusal of documents (when not demonstrated). For example, in

16

Hiram

Ricker

& Sons v. Students

International

Meditation

Society.

501 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1974), the Court held that:
A crucial aspect of the business-records exception is
that entries be prepared as a regular part of the
business . . . .
Otherwise, there is no basis for the
presumption of reliability which is at the heart of the
exception.
501 F.2d at 554 (citations omitted, original emphasis). The Court went on
to hold that calculations prepared by business employees were not
admissible because they had been prepared only after the manager of the
business became suspicious that the counts being provided to him by a
customer were not accurate.
Similarly, in United States v. Kim. 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
a Telex message was held inadmissible as a business record even though the
Defendant offering it proved that it had been received by one bank from
another bank.

The basis of the ruling was that while the message was a

H

Telex and while the bank did receive such messages in its operations, this

message had been prompted by the particular matter in dispute."

In so

holding, the court relied upon the comments of the Advisory Committee
associated with Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
[T]he telex does not fall within the business
records exception [because] it was not made for a
regular business purpose. In order for a document to
qualify as a business record, it must have been the
"regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum . . . ." The Advisory Committee on
Proposed Rules explained the reason for this
requirement:
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The element of unusual reliability
of business records is said
variously to be supplied . . . by
actual experience of business in
relying upon them, or by a duty
to make an accurate record as
part of a continuing job or
occupation.
595 F.2d at 761 (citations omitted, footnote omitted). As already noted, the
computer calculations offered by Respondent in this case are not relied
upon by the Respondent for any independent business purpose, only for
proving its damage claims. They have, accordingly, no more reliability than
a printout prepared by an attorney specializing in representing plaintiffs in
personal injury actions who input the client's age, injuries, occupation, and
other factors into a computer which then generated a prognostication of
the damages which she was entitled to recover.
Legal writers have also emphasized the need for caution in
providing adequate foundation for computer-generated calculations.
writer notes:
In light of complex computer systems' susceptibility to
numerous possibilities for error, the question arises
whether additional safeguards should be required before
computerized records are admitted into evidence
Judges and commentators who have considered the
foundation accorded conventional records to be equally
satisfactory for computer-generated ones have failed to
account for the significant differences between the two
types of evidence. . . . There is a serious risk with
computer records that the judge, and perhaps even
more so the jury, will be overly impressed by the
computer's mystique and will unnecessarily accept its
output as reliable.
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One

There are at least five major classifications of
electronic data processing errors. Technologists label
environmentally induced errors and hardware failures as
mechanical shortcomings. They consider systems design
and programming errors, operating mistakes, and input
errors to be human errors.

Programming errors . in any one of the various
levels are relatively common. A single mistake may be
seriously compounded if a computer obediently uses an
erroneous instruction several times.
Programming
errors are notorious for producing absurd results.

A number of judges have insisted that litigants
seeking the admission of computer evidence under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule offer an
evidentiary foundation responsive to the possible errors
. . . .
It is these cases that set the desirable
precedent, rather than those which permit entry of
computer material on a basis similar to that afforded
manual business records.

Judges who have expressed concern about the
reliability of computer data have generally preferred
that high ranking employees of computer departments,
as opposed to accountants or comptrollers, describe the
machinery and procedures.
N°te, A Reconsideration of the Admissibility of

Computer-Generated

Evidence, 126 U. of Pa. L.Rev. 425 at 437-39, 441, 446-48 (footnotes and
citations omitted). Another writer notes:
[T]he traditional foundation requirements of the
business records exception to the hearsay rule are
ineffective to ensure the reliability of a computer
printout. A review of the case law suggests that the
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courts have failed to recognize this problem and
consequently have not developed an adequate test.

The reliability of the computer printout is the
most important factor in determining whether the
record should be admitted under the business records
exception. . . . Selection of input data, processing
input data, and programming are the primary causes of
human errors. . . .

[A] computer printout poses a set of problems not
common to a traditional record keeping system0 The
result is that the statutory foundation requirements
developed for testing the reliability of traditional
business records are inadequate when applied to
computer printouts.
Note, Appropriate

Foundation

Requirements

for

Admitting

Computer

Printouts Into Evidence. 59 Wash. Univ. Law Quarterly 59 at 62, 75, and 78
(footnotes omitted).

At the very least, computer-generated calculations

must be admitted only with the foundation required by the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Such foundation was clearly not established by the testimony in
this case.

Accordingly, the computer-generated document received as

Exhibit 1 was inadmissible and the trial court erred in admitting that
document.
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B.

There Was No Evidence of Any Proximate Causal Relationship Between

Defendant Baker's Conduct and the Damages Calculated in the ComputerGenerated "Bill."
It is, of course, a fundamental rule of negligence law that the
defendant is liable only for those damages proximately caused by his
conduct and which, but for his conduct, would not have occurred. Although
there was no foundation provided as to how the dollar amount set forth in
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 were calculated, it is apparent that the document
attempts to include a wide variety of indirect costs.
While some courts do allow

the inclusion of

some

indirect

expenses in the measure of damages for the loss of or damage to utility
property, the cases uniformly require a showing that such costs were caused
by the defendant's conduct.
more

than

made

whole

In other words, no court allows a utility to be
at

the

expense

of

an

individual

who

has

unintentionally damaged its facilities.
The question of the recoverability of such indirect expenses was
before the court in Davton Power & Light v. Hershner. supra.

In holding

that cost summaries more detailed than, but otherwise essentially identical
with, the computer-generated

"bill" relied upon by Respondent in the

present case were inadequate

to prove a utility's damages, the court

attempted to articulate the distinction between indirect costs appropriately
included for accounting purposes and indirect costs recoverable in a legal
action:
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[The defendant] further asserts that accounting
procedures cannot establish principles of tort liability.
[He] maintains that there must be a demonstration by
DP&L of a proximate relationship between the
company's alleged damages and [his] tort
In [his]
view, there was no firsthand testimony or affidavits of
any witness regarding proximate causation, and
therefore DP&L has relied solely upon accounting
niceties and computer-generated summaries to provide
this vital link in the tort-proximate causation-damage
claim of proof required in all negligence cases.

A public utility may recover direct expenses as
damages for the negligent destruction of its utility
pole,, But in order for the public utility to recover
indirect overhead expenses, it must come forth with
evidence proving that the indirect expenses would not
have been paid but for the negligence of defendant.
Slip Op., infra at A-11.

In the present case, any such evidence is wholly

lacking.
Another
addressing

the

case

involving

question

of

the

damage

to

recoverability

utility
of

facilities

indirect

directly

damages

is

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company v. Brock. No. C-830137 (Ohio Ct. App.,
filed December 21, 1983)4 in which the utility sought recovery for a pole
negligently damaged by the defendant.

The trial focused on the work

required to repair the damages and the accounting system used to compute
the cost of those repairs.

The utility presented the testimony of nine

witnesses and nineteen trial exhibits. The court began its analysis with the
observations that the recoverable damages were "limited to those injuries
4

The text of this unreported opinion,
reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-12.
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retrieved

via

Lexis,

is

flowing directly from, and as the proximate and natural result of, the
defendant's

wrong" and that the task of determining

the appropriate

measure of damages was complicated when the plaintiff itself made the
repairs.

(Slip Op., infra at A-13.)

As Respondent has attempted to do in

this case, the utility presented testimony at trial of its actual costs and
then increased those costs by various overhead factors.

In effect, the

Court held that the utility could not rely exclusively upon accounting
principles to prove its damages:
With respect to labor, the cost charged to the
defendant was the product of the total, direct labor
hours expended by the individual employees within each
of several classifications of employees assigned to
replace the pole times an average wage rate for each
employee classification.
While this may be sound
accounting practice, it is not acceptable with respect
to the law of damages. . . .
The method currently used to calculate labor costs
gives an average cost for an employee within a certain
classification rather than the actual cost of the
particular employee who made the repair. The law of
damages provides that only those damages proximately
or directly caused by the defendant's negligence are
compensable.
Thus, as to this one aspect of the
judgment, the damage caused by the defendant can be
and should have been directly traced to the cost of a
particular employee's labor, rather than the cost of
some mythical "average" employee. The plaintiff failed
to prove that all the elements of damage presented to
the court were proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Slip Op., infra at A-14.

The Court went on to note that, with respect to

the other, "overhead," expenses, there had been no proper showing of direct
or proximate causation:
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[T]he law of damages is just what its name
implies — a legal concept, not an accounting concept.
The two disciplines are not synonymous and their
distinct purposes must not be confused. With respect
to an operation such as that of the plaintiff or a
manufacturer, the purpose of the accountant, as stated
by plaintiff's accounting supervisor, is to take all the
costs of operating a business and distribute them in a
fair and equitable manner to each job done by the
business. . . . While the law is concerned that all the
"costs" of all torts committed against a plaintiff are
recovered, the law is not concerned with whether each
tortfeasor bears an equal portion of the total overhead
in relation to the direct costs. To the contrary, the
purpose of the law is to require the tortfeasor to pay
only those costs incurred because of his actions.
Accordingly, the law requires the tortfeasor to pay for
those overhead costs which, with reasonable diligence
by the victim, can be directly attributed with
reasonable certainty to the tortfeasor.

[T]he defendant was charged with a portion of
certain costs that were directly incurred because of
other accidents but not directly incurred because of
the defendant's accident. Such charges are not in
conformity with the rule previously stated that one is
liable only for those damages that directly flow from
the injury sustained. . . .
The thrust of our decision today is not that
overhead costs are never recoverable.
It is our
purpose to point out that some overhead costs are not
attributable to a particular defendant and cannot be
charged to him. The question in each case to be
decided by the trier of fact is: what is the amount of
indirect costs (overhead) which has been proved with
reasonable certainty to have been directly and
proximately caused by defendant's negligence?
Slip Op., infra at A-15-17. Because of the manner in which Respondent
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chose to present its trial testimony and the virtual lack of foundation for
its sole damage exhibit, these critical questions cannot be addressed.
Similarly, in another case involving damage to utility facilities,
the

Court

held

in

Davton

Power

& Light

Company

v.

Puterbaugh.

No. 79 CA 13, (Ohio Ct. App., March 7, 1980)5:
[The utility] presented no evidence whatsoever
that these so-called indirect overhead costs would not
have been paid, notwithstanding the negligent actions
of [the defendant].
No evidence was presented to
show, for example, that due to [the defendant's]
negligence, extra employees had to be called in to
work, thereby necessitating extra payroll taxes,
insurance, etc. In the absence of evidence that [the
utility's] indirect costs were incurred as a result of
[the defendant's] negligence, [the utility] has failed to
demonstrate that the damages it seeks to recover flow
directly from and as a natural, probable, and proximate
result of the wrong complained of.
Slip Op., infra at A-24. The Court went on to note its agreement with the
proposition that:
The supervision costs, unless directly connected with
the repair of the pole and line, the store expenses, and
the general overhead, are such expenses that would
have been incurred and paid, without regard to the
breaking of the pole. They constitute a part of the
operating expenses of the plaintiff and this Court can
see no relation of these costs to the negligence of the
defendant. . . .
Id., infra at A-24. These observations are equally applicable to the facts of
the case now before this Court.

The Respondent utility made no effort

whatsoever to present any evidence of any nature whatsoever as to the
5

A copy of the unreported opinion, obtained from the Clerk of the
Court, is reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-18.
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critical issue of proximate causation.

Moreover, the Respondent utility in

this case did not even present direct evidence of what supplies were used.
Mr. Newkirk testified (R. at 110) that he kept no list of the materials that
he used and Ms. Nielsen testified (R. at 96) that she had no knowledge of
what supplies were used.

Magically, however, the computer printout places

a precise dollar value on these supplies. (See. Exhibit P-l reproduced infra
at A-26.)

At best, it must be presumed that the value placed upon the

supplies was based upon some perceived average supply cost but the
utilization of such average values is inappropriate.6

The trial court erred

in awarding damages based on such inappropriate evidence.

C.

There Being No Admissible Proof of Damages, the Trial Court Erred in

Entering Judgment.
As noted above, the only evidence of the Respondent utility's
damages was the computer-generated calculations.

These were admitted

without proper foundation and should have been excluded under the hearsay
rule.

Moreover, the Respondent utility failed to present any evidence that

the indirect overhead items — that more than doubled its actual damages—

6

It is no more appropriate in this case involving property damage to
utility facilities to rely upon average costs and expenses than it would be
in a personal injury action to award medical expenses, lost wages, or
general damages based upon what average or typical personal injury
plaintiffs sustain, allege, or recover. While such average values may be
perfectly appropriate and defensible from an accounting standpoint, they are
anathema to the law of damages.
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were directly or proximately caused by the conduct of either of the
defendants in this action.
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the Respondent utility bears
little, if any, relevance to the reasonable value of the repairs necessitated
by the damage to the telephone cable.

Yet it is the reasonable cost of

such repairs that it the measure of damage.

For example, in a simple

automobile accident case, the fact that the plaintiff spends $5,000.00
repairing his vehicle has little bearing on what he is entitled to recover.
He is entitled to recover only the reasonable and ordinary cost of those
repairs. Accordingly, the computer-generated calculations, even if arguendo
admissible, demonstrate nothing more than what the utility claims it cost to
repair the damage. This evidence is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible
under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, on the true question of the
reasonable and ordinary cost of effecting these repairs.
The

total

lack

of

relevance

of

the

computer-generated

calculations to the true question of the reasonable and ordinary cost of the
repairs is demonstrated by the fact that no one knows what supplies were
actually used, yet a supply expense appears in the calculation. The lack of
relevance is also demonstrated by the fact that the calculations apparently
include cost factors related to aerial ladder trucks, which were obviously
totally unnecessary to the repair of this underground cable.7
7

Mr. Newkirk testified that he and his four employees simply drove
whatever company vehicles they were assigned to the job site and
acknowledged that the aerial ladder trucks were not needed on this
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There being no admissible evidence of any damage actually
sustained by the Respondent utility, the trial court erred in entering any
judgment against Appellant. Having failed to prove its damages, a no cause
of action dismissal should have been entered against the Respondent utility.

POINT II, DEFENDANT BAKER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED.
Defendant Baker moved both at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case
(R. at 114) and at the end of the trial (R. at 160) for the dismissal of the
Plaintiff's case upon the basis that the Plaintiff
negligence on the part of Defendant Baker.

had demonstrated no

The trial court denied both

motions.

A.

Plaintiff Was Not Entitled to the Benefit of the Prima Facie Evidence

Provision of Section 54-8a-6(2).
At the trial, the Respondent utility offered no evidence of any
negligence on the part of either of the Defendants.

The utility called only

two witnesses, its records clerk, Ms. Nielsen, and its repair supervisor,
Mr. Newkirk.

Both admitted that they had no knowledge of how the cable

had been damaged. (R. at 97-98 and 106.)
Faced with the absence of any evidence of any negligence on the
part of either of the Defendants, the Respondent utility relied upon the
particular job. (See. R. at 113.)
28

provisions of Section 54-8a-6(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
That section states:
An underground facility damaged by a person who
fails to comply with Section 54-8a-4 is prima facie
evidence that the damage was caused through the
negligence of that person.
It must be noted that failure to comply with Section 54-8a-4 is a condition
precedent

to

the

prima

facie

evidence

provision

of

the

statute.

Section 54-8a-4 provides, in relevant part, that:
No person, except in an emergency or while
gardening or tilling private ground, may make an
excavation without first notifying each public utility
company . . . .
Thus, the requirement of notification to a utility is conditional.
no requirement of notification if

M

an emergency" exists.

There is

In this case, the

Respondent utility offered no evidence on the question of an emergency.
Accordingly, it did not demonstrate any violation of Section 54-8a-4 by
either of the Defendants.
necessary

to

trigger

Consequently, it did not establish the facts
the

prima

facie

evidence

provision

of

Section 54-8a-6(2).
Accordingly, since the Respondent utility neither demonstrated
any breach by either Defendant of Section 54-8a-4 nor any negligence on
the part of either Defendant, the Respondent utility failed to establish a
necessary element (i.e., negligence) of its case. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case (R. at 160) should have been
. granted by the trial court.
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Unfortunately, throughout the trial, the trial court demonstrated
an eagerness to assist the Respondent utility by limiting the issues.

For

example, before the trial commenced, before opening statements had even
been made, the trial court observed:
Gentlemen, before we start taking evidence, from the
pleadings, it would appear that there's little question
about the damage that was done to the plaintiff's
property. Is that really in dispute?
R. at 81.

Although Mr. Baker's counsel stipulated that the backhoe had

contacted the cable, it was repeatedly made clear that the amount of that
damage was in dispute. (E.g.. R. at 82, 83, and 84.)

Having learned that

the question of damages was in dispute, the trial court then manifest an
eagerness to predetermine liability:
THE COURT:

Then, as far as the plaintiff's claim
is concerned, is it now just a
question of establishing the damages,
the cost of repair?

MR. ENGLAND:

I believe — in our opinion, yes,
Your Honor. We'll have testimony
to the amount of the bill and so
forth.

MR. PARKEN:

Well, if I understand the Court's
question, the Court is saying that
liability is clear or obvious.

THE COURT:

No, I am not talking about liability.
The fact is the cable was cut, it's a
question now of who is liable.

MR. PARKEN:

If anyone.
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THE COURT:

If anyone, and it's also -- I think
that's a matter that's primarily at
issue between the defendant and
cross-defendant.

MR. PARKEN:

Well, I don't know that I agree.
There's certainly an issue between
the two defendants as to who should
bear the responsibility, if either is
liable to the plaintiff. The question

THE COURT:

Well, the - it seems to me that
this is the point we have, sir. The
law requires certain things be done.

MR. PARKEN:

Well -

THE COURT:

- it's stipulated that certain things
were not done. The line was cut.
That has all been stipulated to.

R. at 84-85. (emphasis added).

Unfortunately, the trial court, before

opening statements were offered, before the first witness had been sworn,
and before a shred of evidence had been received, had already determined
that, if a utility's line had been damaged, at least one of the defendants
was to be held liable.

That belief, as demonstrated by the foregoing

statutes, is entirely contrary to Utah law.
Moreover, the trial court's comments in response to counsel's
argument in support of the motion to dismiss demonstrate that the Court
misunderstood the statutory scheme:
THE COURT:

Well, the section you cite says that
this section is inapplicable to an
excavation
made
during
an
emergency, which involves danger to
life, health or property. I think, on
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the other hand, the prima facie
provision is sufficient to carry on
the case and I would deny plaintiff's
motion for judgment and I would
deny your motion at this time, sir.

MR. PARKEN:

Excuse me, Your Honor. Could you
tell me which statute you just read?

THE COURT:

I just read 54-8a-8, sub 3.

MR. PARKEN:

Okay. Well, sub 3 is not - that's
not where we're talking about, if I
may.

THE COURT:

I know that, but this defines — it
says that it's — when it's — defines
emergency0 It says health, life, or
property, and I think I would accept
that as the definition intended.

R. at 115-116. In reality, what the trial court was reading related only to
a "civil penalty," which was not even sought by the Plaintiff.

Moreover,

the definition that the court read was clearly limited to the civil penalty
section because it begins with the phrase, "This section is inapplicable to .
. . ." (Section 54-8a-8(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).)

It

would also seem likely that, particularly in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, raw sewage overflowing into a residential basement and
running down a gravel driveway in a residential area would "involve danger
to life . . . or property."
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B. The Evidence Was Undisputed That an Emergency Existed and That All
Backhoe Operations Were Conducted in a Careful and Prudent Manner,
Even if the trial court's refusal to dismiss Plaintiff's action for
its failure to prove either its damages or any negligence on the part of
either of the Defendants can be justified on the basis that the existence of
an emergency is an affirmative defense under the statutory scheme, the
trial court still erred because the existence of such an emergency was
clearly demonstrated by the unrefuted evidence. Lyle Crawley, Defendant
Baker's employee who received Defendant Hansen's telephone call for help,
testified that Defendant Hansen told him that raw sewage was coming up
through his driveway and that he needed immediate assistance (R. at 118).
Mr. Crawley also testified that, in the ordinary course of Defendant Baker's
business, such conditions were deemed emergencies and were given priority
over all other types of work.

(M-) Mr. Crawley also testified that when

he arrived at Mr. Hansen's residence, he observed raw sewage leaking from
the sewer line, that it was running down the middle of his driveway, and
that there was enough of a leak to constitute a real problem. (R. at 119.)
Roger Duvall, the backhoe operator who went to assist Defendant Hansen,
also testified that sewage breaks were given priority because "raw sewage is
a health hazard." (R. at 131.) He also noted that "broken sewer lines have
top priority because they're a real potential health hazard[;] broken water
lines have second priority." (R. at 132.) He noted that when he arrived at
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the jobsite, he noted "a cesspool of raw sewage bubbling up through the
ground, I would say approximately 5 foot diameter." (R. at 133.)
Defendant Hansen also verified in his testimony the severity of
the problem and confirmed that he had told Defendant Baker's company
that "I had raw sewage in my basement and it was running down also in my
driveway . . . ." (R. at 150.) He testified that he considered repairing the
sewer line to be a matter of great urgency, that he stayed home from work
to take care of it, and that it would not have been possible to live in his
house over the weekend had the sewer not been cleared. (See, R. at 158.)
At trial, the Respondent utility presented no evidence to the
contrary.

Accordingly, the record is totally unrefuted that there was a

serious problem with raw sewage running down a gravel driveway and
bubbling up through the ground in a H5-foot cesspool" in a residential area.
Under such circumstances, the trial court was obligated, as a matter of law,
to find that an emergency existed. Accordingly, the trial court misapplied
relevant law in granting to the Respondent utility the benefit of the prima
facie evidence provision contained in the statute.
Moreover, the record was equally undisputed that all backhoe
operations were conducted in a slow, careful, and cautious manner in
accordance with usual industry practices.

The backhoe operator, Roger

Duvall, testified without any contradiction that he had operated a backhoe
in residential areas on approximately 300 occasions (R. at 130) and that he
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would dig no deeper with the backhoe bucket than had previously been
explored manually with a shovel:
Question:

[H]ow much dirt would you have been
cutting through with each swath of the
backhoe?

Answer:

It would depend on how deep he went
with the shovel, it would be six to eight,
ten inches.

Question:

But you wouldn't go any deeper than the
shovel went?

Answer:

No deeper than the depth of the shovel.

R. at 137. He also testified that this procedure of exploring manually with
a shovel first was an acceptable and widely used one within the Salt Lake
area.

(R. at 137.)

He testified that his backhoe could dig at various

speeds but that he operated Mslow and carefulH at all times because he knew
he was in close proximity to a clay sewer pipe, which is extremely
vulnerable. (R. at 139.) Moreover, he discovered the communications cable
before damaging it, asked Defendant Hansen what it was, verified that
Defendant Hansen had told him it was a tree root, and proceeded only after
these multiple reassurances.
In light of the strong evidence that Mr. Duvall operated the
backhoe in a slow, careful, and cautious manner and the unrefuted
testimony that he discovered the utilities cable before damaging it and
proceeded to apply force against it only after having been (mistakenly)
reassured by Defendant Hansen that it was a tree root, the Respondent
utility presented not a shred of evidence of any negligence on the part of
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any employee of Defendant Baker.

Accordingly, since the prima facie

evidence provision of the statute was inapplicable and since no evidence of
any negligence on the part of the backhoe operator was presented, the trial
court's Finding of negligence on the part of Defendant Baker's employee is
directly contrary to the unrefuted evidence.
It should be noted that any attempt to find that the backhoe
operator was negligent simply because the Blue Stakes program was not
called is contrary to the statutory scheme. The statute says that the Blue
Stakes program must be contacted unless an emergency exists. In this case,
the evidence was unrefuted that an emergency did exist.

Accordingly,

failure to call the Blue Stakes program cannot constitute either negligence
or negligence per se because the applicable statute did not require contact
with the Blue Stakes program under the existing circumstances.

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DEFENDANT
BAKER'S CROSSCLAIM.
If either of the Defendants was liable to the Respondent utility,
then the liability should rest with Respondent Hansen.

The evidence was

uncontradicted that it was his decision not to contact the Blue Stakes
program. Mr. Crawley testified that Mr. Hansen said that he knew "where
all the utilities are on [his] property and [that] there's nothing anywhere
near."

(R. at 117.) Moreover, Defendant Baker's company offered to send

Respondent Hansen a "full crew" (consisting of a backhoe operator and a
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"laborer to spot for utility lines") but Mr. Hansen wanted to "operate the
shovel" himself.

(See. R. at 134-135.) The backhoe operator, Roger Duvall,

testified that he explained to Mr. Hansen what was needed of him and that
it appeared to him that Mr. Hansen knew what was expected of him.
(R. at 135.)
Moreover, Mr. Duvall located, before damaging it, the utility
cable and asked Mr. Hansen to ascertain what it was:
Mr. Duvall:

As I was reaching out, Mr. Hansen had
gone ahead of me with the shovel, as I
came down, I started to drag the bucket
towards me and I felt tension on my
bucket. And I was only ~ well, at this
point, I think I was approximately two to,
two-and-a-half-feet deep, maybe three
feet deep, and I felt tension on the
bucket, so I immediately backed my
bucket up, and lifted it straight upwell, as the bucket had came forward,
there was — the dirt had fallen over,
ahead of the bucket, and I noticed a
black —

Question:

Object?

Answer:

- object going across my bucket, so I
immediately backed up, I lifted the bucket
and pointed to Mr. Hansen and asked him
to investigate and see what it was . . . .
Mr. Hansen got down with the shovel and
cleaned around it, he looked up at me,
and
he
said
something,
I was
approximately ten feet from him in the
backhoe, the backhoe was — motor was
sounding. He said something, I did not
quite hear what he said, so I hollered
down to him, I says, what did you say,
and he says, tree root. I repeated, it's a
tree root, and he said, yes, tear it out.
So, I put my bucket back, I dropped it
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down to that point, and I started to curl
it. . . . There was an excessive amount
of tension, I did not feel it was a tree
root, I uncurled my bucket, lifted it up,
and I looked at him and says, check it
again. He got down in the trench, he
looked up at me, and he says, it's some
kind of a cable.
R. at 138-139.
In his testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that he had been
offered a crew but desired only a backhoe operator, offering to do the rest
of the work himself (R. at 150), and also acknowledged that he had been
asked to identify the object that Mr. Duvall had unearthed prior to the
damage to that object (R. at 159).

He also acknowledged that he

mistakenly told Mr. Duvall it was a tree root. (R. at 159.)
Accordingly, it was Respondent Hansen who requested that the
Blue Stakes program not be called; it was Respondent Hansen who stated
that he did not want a full crew; it was Respondent Hansen who agreed to
act as the "spotter" for the operation; and it was Respondent Hansen who
mistakenly identified the telephone cable as a tree root after Defendant
Baker's employee had discovered the object without damaging it.

Under

these circumstances, the trial court's Findings that there was no negligence
on the part of Defendant Hansen and that all of the negligence was that of
the backhoe operator are directly contrary to the unrefuted evidence
received at trial.

Thus, in the event that the trial court determined that

Defendant Baker had liability to the Respondent utility, the trial court was
also obligated to grant Defendant Baker judgment against Respondent
38

Hansen on the crossclaim since all of the negligence and fault was that of
Respondent Hansen. The trial court erred in dismissing the crossclaim.

CONCLUSION
There was no admissible evidence of the damages claimed by the
Respondent utility.

There was no evidence of any negligence on the part

of Defendant Baker's backhoe operator. There was unrefuted evidence that
the raw sewage leaking from the sewer line constituted an emergency.
There was unrefuted evidence that it was at Respondent Hansen's decision
that the Blue Stakes program not be called, that he act as the "spotter,"
and

that

it

was

Respondent

Hansen

who

mistakenly

identified

the

communications cable prior to its damage.
Under these circumstances, a judgment of no cause of action and
dismissal should have been entered against the Plaintiff.
a judgment of indemnification
Defendant

Baker

against

In the alternative,

should have been entered

Respondent

Hansen.

The

in favor

matter

should

of
be

remanded to the trial court with instructions that a judgment of dismissal
be entered against the Plaintiff.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1987.

PARKEN & KECK

By
John D. Parken
Attorney for DefendantAppellant Baker
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CHAPTER 8a
DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND UTILITY
FACILITIES
Section
54-8a-l. Purpose of chapter.
54-8a-2. Definitions.
54-8a-3. Information filed with county clerk
and recorder.
04"Oa-4. Notice of excavation with power
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54~8a-5. Marking of underground facilities.
54-8a-6. Excavator's duties and liabilities.

54-8a-7. Notice of damage — Repairs.

Section
54-Sa-8.

Civil penalty for damage — Action
by public utility, cable operator,
or county attorney — Exceptions — Remedies supplemental.
54-8a-9. Association for mutual receipt of notification of excavation activities,
54-Sa-10. Installation offiberopticcables.

54-8a-l. Purpose of chapter.
It is the purpose of this chapter to protect underground facilities from destruction, damage, or dislocation in order to prevent death or injury to persons, damage to private and public property, or the loss of service to the
public.

54-8a-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Excavation" means any operation in which earth, rock, or other
material on or below the ground is moved or otherwise displaced by
means of tools, equipment, or explosives, and includes grading,, trenching,
digging, ditching, drilling, augering, tunnelling, scraping, and cable or
pipe plowing and driving.
(2) "Underground facility" means any personal property which is buried or placed below ground level for use in the storage or conveyance of
water, sewage, electronic, telephonic or telegraphic communications, television or telecommunication signals, electric energy, oil, gas, or other
substances, including but not limited to, pipes, sewers, conduits, cables,
fiberoptic cables, valves, lines, wires, manholes, attachments, and those
parts of poles below ground.
(3) "Person" means an individual,firm,joint venture, partnership, corporation, association, municipality, public agency, governmental unit,
department, or agency, or a trustee, receiver, assignee, or personal representative thereof.
(4) "Business day" means any day other than Saturday, Sunday, or a
legal holiday.
(5) "Cable operator" means any person who provides cable service over
a cable system.
(6) "Cable service" means the transmission to subscribers of video or
other programming.
(7) "Cable system" means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal generation, reception, and control
equipment that is designed to provide cable service which includes video
programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within a
community. It does not include: (a) a facility that serves only to retransmit the television signals of one or more television broadcast stations; or
(b) a facility that serves only subscribers in one or more multiple unit
dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless the
facility uses any public right-of-way.

54-8a-3. Information filed with county clerk and recorder.
Every public utility and cable operator shall file the name of every municipality, city, or town with the county clerk and recorder of a county in which it
has underground facilities, and a list containing the name of the public utility
or cable operator and the title, telephone number, and address of its representative designated to receive calls concerning excavation. In counties where an
association as provided in § 54-8a-9 is established, the telephone number of
A-2

that association shall be filed with the county clerk and recorder on behalf of
all participating public utilities and cable operators.

54-8a-4. Notice of excavation with power equipment.
No person, except in an emergency or while gardening or tilling private
ground, may make an excavation without first notifying each public utility
company, private culinary water company, or cable operator which may have
underground facilities in the area of the proposed excavation. Initial notice
shall be given by telephone or in person not less than two business days nor
more than seven days before the commencement of excavation and shall include the proposed excavation's anticipated location, dimensions, and duration. If an excavation on a single project lasts more than 14 days, the excavator shall give such notice at least once each 14 days during the continuation of
the project. If there is an association as provided in § 54-8a-9 in the county, a
call to that association is notice to each public utility and cable operator in the
county.

54-8a-5. Marking of underground facilities.
A public utility or cable operator, upon receipt of the notice required by
§ 54-8a-4, shall advise the excavator as promptly as practical, but in no event
later than one business day after notice, of the location of its underground
facilities in the area proposed for excavation by marking such facilities with
stakes, paint, or in some other customary way, indicating horizontal location
within 24 inches of the outside dimensions of both sides of the underground
facility. Each marking shall be effective for not more than 15 days from the
date it is made. No person may begin excavation before the location and
marking is complete or before two business days have expiredfromthe date of
initial notification.

54-8a-6. Excavator's duties and liabilities.
(1) A person who is informed under § 54-8a-5 is not excusedfromexcavating in a careful and prudent manner, nor is that person excusedfromliability
for damage or injury which results from negligent excavation.
(2) An underground facility damaged by a person who fails to comply with
§ 54-8a-4 is prima facie evidence that the damage was caused through the
newpence of that person,.
""" " ~
'

54-8a-7- Notice of damage — Repairs.
A person who in the course of excavation contacts or damages an underground facility shall immediately notify the designated representative of the
appropriate public utility or cable operator. Upon receipt of notice, the representative shall immediately dispatch personnel to examine the underground
facility, and, if necessary, the personnel shall make repairs.

54-8a-8. Civil penalty for damage — Action by public utility, cable operator, or county attorney — Exceptions — Remedies supplemental.
(1) Any person who excavates without first complying with §§ 54-8a-4 and
54-8a-5 and who damages, dislocates, or disturbs an underground facility is,
upon proof of negligence, subject to a civil penalty of up to the maximum fine
for "a class Bmisdemeanor under § 76-3-301 for the first offense and also for

A-3

each subsequent offense.
(2) Actions to recover the civil penalties under this section shall be brought
either by the public utility or the cable operator whose underground facilities
are damaged or by the county attorney of the county in which the damage
occurs. All penalties recoveredfromsuch action shall be paid into the Genera]
Fund
(3) This section is inapplicable to an excavation made during an emergency
which involves danger to life, health, or property if reasonable precautions are
taken to protect underground facilities, nor is it applicable to an excavation
made in agricultural operations or for the purpose of finding or extracting
natural resources or to an excavation made with hand tools on property owned
or occupied by the person performing the excavation.
(4) The remedies in this section are in addition to the right of an injured
public utility or cable operator to recover damages.

54-8a-9. Association for mutual receipt of notification of
excavation activities.
(1) Two or more public utilities or cable operators may form and operate an
association providing for mutual receipt of notification of excavation activities
in a specified area. In areas where an association is formed, notification to the
association is affected [effected] as set forth in § 54-8a-4. In areas where aa
association is formed, public utilities and cable operators with underground
facilities in the area shall become members of the association or participate in
and receive the services furnished by it„ A public utility owned by a pubhc
agency or municipality shall participate in and receive the service furnished
by the association and pay its share of the cost for the service furnished. The
association whose members or participants have underground facilities within
a county shall file a description of the geographical area served by the association and list the name and address of every member and participating public
utility or cable operator with the county clerk and the county recorder.
(2) If notification is made by telephone, an adequate record shall be maintained by the association to document compliance with the requirements of
this chapter.

54-8a-10. Installation of fiberoptic cables.
Any public utility utilizing a fiberoptic cable shall install the fiberoptic
cable in a concrete multiduct conduit system or so that it can be located with
standard metal detection devices.
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Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable.
(a) Definition of unavailability: "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement;
or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable
means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the,declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if
the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing
that his death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of
its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to
render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other
similar fact of personal or family history, even though the declarant had
no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another
person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, adoption, or
marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be
likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it,
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
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THE

DAYTON POWER
MARION

& LIGHT CO., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
HERSHNER, Defendant-Appellant

Dayton Power vs. Hershner
Slip Opinion
NO. 1101
March 27, 1981
COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, GREENE COUNTY, OHIO
PHILLIPS, J.

OPINION

Defendant-appellant, Marion Hershner, appeals to this
Court from a judgment of the Xenia Municipal Court in favor of
plaintiff-appellee, appellee, Dayton Power and Light Company
(DP&L), in the amount of $467.52.
On October 2, 1977, appellant's automobile collided
with a utility pole owned by DP&L. In appellant's supplemental
answers to DP&L's interrogatories, he indicated that he glanced
in his rear view mirror, drifted off the road to his right, and
hit a telephone pole. The company replaced the pole, and filed a
complaint on May 23, 1978 against appellant seeking to recover
the costs of repair.
DP&L filed a motion for summary judgment on the issues
of negligence and damages on December 11, 1978. The motion was
supported by an affidavit of Craig S. Zimmerman, assistant
supervisor in DP&L's plant accounting department. Attached to the
affidavit and incorporated therein were four pages labeled "Work
Order Cost Summary." Paragraph nine of the affidavit states "that
the total expense of $467.52 reasonably and accurately reflects
the actual cost incurred to the Dayton Power and Light Company in
repairing the damage to its property."
In opposition to DP&L's motion for summary judgment,
appellant filed, 1) a memorandum contra motion for summary
judgment, and 2) a personal affidavit. A hearing on the summary
judgment was held before the court on March 15, 1979, with
appellant thereafter filing a supplemental memorandum contra the
motion for summary judgment on May 4, 1979.
The trial court in its decision and entry of June 19,
1979, stated in pertinent part:
"The Court is of the opinion, after considering all the
arguments and the law offered in support on both sides, that the
better and logical reasoning is in favor of Plaintiff's position.
Defendant's main argument is that the indirect expenses charged
by Plaintiff are not directly applicable or proximate to the
damages incurred to Plaintiff's property. While this is not a
specious argument, and one that does have some basis in reported
case law, the Court feels that true compensatory damages must
include the indirect expenses found in the general and
administrative catagories as elements of the cost to replace the
pole, and hence compensible."
The trial court sustained DP&L motion for summary
judgment, and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff DP&L in the
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amount of $467.52.
Appellant asserts as his sole assignment of error:
"THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SAID
PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $467.52 IN THAT PLAINTIFF HAD NO
EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER AS TO DAMAGES WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE INTO SAID
EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE 2317.40 (BUSINESS RECORD
STATUTE) AND BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DEMONSTRATION WHATSOEVER OF
PROXIMATE CAUSATION BETWEEN THE TORT OF THE DEFENDANT AND ANY OF
THE DAMAGES ALLEGED."
A.
Appellant's first argument is that DP&L has not presented
any evidence as to its damages, as the work order cost summaries
are not admissible into evidence pursuant to the business records
statute, R.C. 2317.40.
Mr. Zimmerman's affidavit, filed with DP&L motion for
summary judgment, stated in pertinent part:
"Affiant further on oath says:
(1) that he is employed by The Dayton Power and Light
Company as an Assistant Supervisor of the Plant Accounting
Department.
(2) That he is the custodian of the attached Work Order
Cost Summaries (Exhibits B and C ) .
(3) that the Work Order Cost Summaries accumulates
and/or provides a reference for the costs incurred in connection
with the installation and/or removal of the Company's property.
Costs for one job are kept separate from those for another job by
the assignment of a unique work order number to each individual
job. In the case of a job involving both the installation and
removal of property, costs for the installation (construction)
are kept separate from those for the removal (retirement) by the
assignment of a "retirement code" in addition to the work order
number.
(4) that the Work Order Cost Summaries are prepared
monthly, in the ordinary
course of business, pursuant to sound
accounting principles, and are based on the experience of the
Company over a long period of time.
(5) that the attached Work Order Costs Summaries
(Exhibits B and C) are a record of the costs incurred by The
Dayton Power and Light Company as a result of property damage
which occurred on October 2, 1977 in Xenia, Ohio on U.S. 35 in
the vicinity of Orange Street and Allison Avenue, which is the
subject of Case No. 78-CV-263 in the Xenia Municipal Court.
(6) that the information contained in the attached work
Order Cost Summaries
was compiled at or near the time of
occurrence stated in paragraph 5 above.
(7) that the costs referred to in paragraph 5 above,
were accumulated on work order number 11847.
Costs for the
removal of the damaged property are listed on one cost summary
marked Exhibit B, and costs for the installation of the new
property are listed on another costs summary marked Exhibit C.

(8) that the total amount of costs actually incurred by
The Dayton Power and Light Company for work order number 11847
was $467.52.
(9) that the total expense of $467.52 reasonably and
accurately reflects the
actual costs incurred to The Dayton
Power and Light Company in repairing the damage to its property."
The work order cost summaries are computer printouts
which list: 1) the date
the information is entered, 2) a
description of the entry, 3) work order number, 4) a retirement
code if any, 5) a voucher or symbol number, and 6) the cost. All
entries are dated 10/77, with the summaries having the date
March, 1978, in the upper right hand corner of each sheet.
R.C. 2317.40 states:
"As used in this section
'business'
includes
every
kind
of
business,
profession,
occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether
carried on for profit or not.
A record of an act, condition, or
event, in so far as relevant, is competent
evidence if the
custodian or the person who made such record or under whose
supervision such record was made testifies to its identity and
the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of
information, method, and time of preparation were such as to
justify its admission.
This section shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make the
law of this state uniform with those states which enact similar
legislation."
This Court recognizes that in today's business world,
computers and computerized bookkeeping have become commonplace,
and that the business records exception to the hearsay rule is
intended to bring the realities of the business world into a
court of law.
In this case, however, DP&L is attempting to prove by
computer printout its unliquidated damages.
This can be
contrasted to the use of computer printouts to show a liquidated
amount due, such as on an account.
Because of the difference
between what the two types of computer printouts are intended to
prove, this Court is not passing on a computer printout's
introduction into evidence pursuant to R.C. 2317.40 in general.
Rather, we confine ourselves to computer printouts introduced for
the purpose of proving unliquidated damages.
Mr. Zimmerman states in his affidavit that: 1) he is
custodian of the work order cost summaries, 2) that the summaries
were prepared in the ordinary course of business, and 3) that the
summary accurately reflects the cost incurred in the replacement
of the pole.
These mere conclusions on the part of the foundation
witness that the records were made in the ordinary course of
business are not a sufficient foundation for the printouts'
introduction into evidence.

Specific proof must be presented that the computer
records were made in the ordinary course of business. This would
include testimony that the printouts were routinely made rather
than specifically prepared for trial, and that they were relied
on by DP&L as sufficiently accurate for business purposes.
Further, the foundation witness must describe in detail
any calculations or abbreviations appearing in the printout.
Abbreviations in DP&L's work cost summaries are not explained.
In addition, the original source of the information contained in
the printout must be
shown, and
the
reliability
and
trustworthiness of the information must be established.
These
requirements were not met by DP&L in its effort to prove
unliquidated damages by the work cost summaries.
However, we find no merit in appellant's contention
that the record needs to be printed near the time of the act.
The entry of the material is the critical issue, not when the
printout of the information occurs.
Our research and that of counsel has not disclosed any
decisions in Ohio concerning computer printouts. However, see
generally 11 ALR 3d 1377; Monarch Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. v.
Genser (1977), 156 N.J. Supr. 107, 383 A.2d 475.
Mr. Zimmerman did not lay the proper foundation for the
introduction of the work cost summaries into evidence. His mere
conclusions as to the printouts, without compliance with the
above enumerated requirements, do not bring this material into
evidence pursuant to Ohio's business records exception.
Summary judgment should not, therefore, have been granted to DP&L
as to the amount of damages, as the moving party did not present
evidence showing it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
B. Appellant further asserts that accounting procedures cannot
establish principles of tort liability.Appellant maintains that
there must be a demonstration by DP&L of a proximate relationship
between the company's alleged damages and the tort of appellant.
In appellant's view, there was no firsthand
testimony or
affidavits of any witness regarding proximate causation, and
therefore DP&L has relied solely upon accounting niceties and
computer-generated summaries to provide this vital link in the
tort-proximate causation-damage claim of proof required in all
negligence cases.
This Court stated in The Dayton Power and Light Co. v.
Puterbaugh (Miami County 1980), unreported, No. 79 CA 13:
"Our decision of the within matter is limited to the facts in
this particular case and does not mean that a public utility may
never recover its indirect overhead expenses as an element of
damages for the negligent destruction of its utility pole. We
do not feel, however, that it places an onerous burden upon such
utilities to come forth with evidence to show that such indirect
expenses would not have been paid but for the negligence of the
defendant. All that is required is that the utility prove that

the damages it seeks to recover naturally and proximately flow
from the wrong complained of."
A public utility may recover direct expenses as damages
for the negligent destruction of its utility pole. But in order
for the public utility to recover indirect overhead expenses, it
must come forth with evidence proving that the indirect expenses
would not have been paid but for the negligence of defendant.
As the trial court erred in 1) allowing plaintiff DP&L's work
order cost summaries into evidence as proof of unliquidated
damages, and 2) permitting DP&L to recover indirect expenses
without proper proof being submitted into evidence, appellant's
assignment of error is sustained..
As there is nothing in defendant's affidavit, memoranda
or brief which contests his liability, that part of the judgment
of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
The trial court's
judgment in favor of plaintiff DP&L in the amount of $467.52 is
hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for computation of
damages consistent with the findings of this Court.
McBRIDE, P. J., and KERNS, J., concur.
CURTIS E. McINTYRE and JOHN B. WYATT, III, Attorneys at Law,
Courthouse Plaza Southwest, P.O. Box 1247, Dayton, Ohio 45401,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
ARTHUR A. AMES, Attorney at Law, 1300 Talbott Tower, Dayton, Ohio
45402, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

THE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. JEFFREY BROCK, Defendant-Appellant.
CG & E Co. vs. Brock
Slip Opinion
APPEAL NO. C-830137, TRIAL NO. 81 CV 36721
December 21, 1983
COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO, HAMILTON
COUNTY,
OHIO
STATEMENT:
Civil Appeal from Hamilton County Municipal Court
KLUSMEIER, J.
OPINION.
On November 11, 1979,
defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Brock drove his car into a utility
pole owned by plaintiff-appellee, Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.
Suit was filed against the defendant in the amount of $835.46 for
damages caused by defendant's negligence. The damages sought by
the plaintiff represented its alleged cost to repair the pole
and restore utility service.
Prior to trial, the defendant stipulated that his
negligence directly and proximately caused damage to the
plaintiff's
utility
pole and transformer. The cause thus
proceeded to trial only on the question of the extent of damages.
At trial, the plaintiff presented the testimony of nine witnesses
along with nineteen exhibits. The defendant called no witnesses,
but did offer into evidence three documents obtained from the
plaintiff's records. The crucial testimony at trial related to
the work required to repair the transformer and replace the pole
and to the accounting system used to compute the cost of those
repairs. At the close of the evidence, the court found that the
plaintiff had not proved that the transformer was damaged as a
result of the defendant's negligence. The court, however, did
find that the plaintiff had proved that the damage to the pole
was proximately caused by the defendant's negligence and that the
amount of damage had also been proved. Judgment was rendered for
the plaintiff in the sum of $750.24 plus costs. The defendant
timely perfected the instant appeal.
The defendant, in his sole assignment of error,
contends that the court erred in granting judgment on the issue
of damages because the plaintiff failed to prove that the damage
had been directly and proximately caused by his negligent act.
We agree in part.
Several courts in this state as well as other states have
considered the issue of damages with respect to the injury or
destruction of a power or telephone pole. See Cincinnati Bell,
Inc. v. Hinterlong (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1981), 70 Ohio Misc. 38,
437 N.E.2d 11 and cases cited therein.
In this regard, the
courts have consistently held that compensatory damages are
intended to make the plaintiff whole for the wrong done to him by
the defendant. From this flow two well-known corollaries — the
plaintiff is not to be placed in a better position then he would

have been in had the wrong not been done, and, damages are
limited to those injuries flowing directly from, and as the
proximate and natural result of, the defendant's wrong.
Neither party contends that this is not the law or that
the law should in any way be altered.
Instead, the parties'
contention centers around the application of these general
principles to a case such as this in which the cost of repair
reflects the measure of damage and the repairs are actually made
by the plaintiff rather than some independent third party. In
the latter case, the cost of repair and, accordingly, the amount
necessary to make the plaintiff whole, generally would be the
amount paid by the plaintiff to the third party that repaired the
damages. Where, however, the plaintiff maintains, as part of its
overall operation, a division specifically for the purpose of
repairing injuries to itself regardless of how the injury occurs,
application of above mentioned rules of damages becomes more
difficult. The difficulty comes in trying to determine whether
certain portions of overhead are properly attributable to the
injury caused by a particular defendant.
Application of the
above rules is further complicated by the fact that the
plaintiff, as a public utility, computes direct costs, such as
the cost of the labor expended in repairing the damaged pole, on
the basis of an accounting system mandated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio as part of their rate supervision responsibilities.
Using that accounting system, the plaintiff computes
the cost of repair with respect to pole damage cases by taking
the sum of the costs of the various aspects of the repair which
have been allocated to three categories or accounts: material
costs, vehicle hours on the job, and man hours worked. A fixed
percentage of the costs incurred with respect to each of these
accounts is then
added to cover "jobbing overhead" and an
additional, similarly calculated amount, is added to the cost of
materials to cover "stores expense."
The controversy on appeal focuses on the methods used
to calculate labor costs and jobbing overhead. These two matters
will be analyzed separately, but it is also necessary that we
examine and rule on the other components of the court's lump sum
award since the entire award is the subject of the assignment of
error.
Testimony at trial was offered to support the various
charges itemized in the defendant's bill. Reference to the bill
shows that the defendant was charged for the cost of the
materials used to make the necessary repairs. This cost was then
increased by the previously mentioned stores expense in order to
cover the cost of disbursing the materials from the plaintiff's
storage facility. An additional charge was made for the cost to
the plaintiff of maintaining and using the vehicles involved in
making the repairs. Upon a careful review of the record with
respect to these particular costs we concur in the trial court's
determination that they were proximately caused by the
defendant's negligence. The same, however, cannot be said with

respect to the labor costs and the jobbing overhead.
With respect to labor, the cost charged to the
defendant was the product of the total, direct labor hours
expended by the individual employees within each of the several
classifications of employees assigned to replace the pole times
an average wage rate for each employee classification„
While
this may be sound accounting practice, it is not acceptable with
respect to the law of damages. The plaintiff's accounting
supervisor testified that the company's records would reflect
which employees worked on this particular repair, the total wages
paid to each employee during the year and the number of
on-the-job hours per employee.
With this information, the
plaintiff could determine its actual
cost per on-the-job hour
for each employee. That amount could then be multiplied by the
number of hours worked by that particular employee to arrive at
the actual cost to the plaintiff of having that employee repair
the damage caused by a particular defendant.
The method
currently being used to calculate labor costs gives an average
cost for an employee within a certain classification rather than
the actual cost of the particular employee who made the repair.
The law of damages provides that only those damages proximately
or
directly caused by the defendant's negligence are
compensable. Thus, as to this one aspect of the judgment, the
damage caused by the defendant can be and should have been
directly traced to the cost of a particular employee's labor,
rather than the cost of some mythical "average1" employee. The
plaintiff failed to prove that all the elements of damage
presented to the court were proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Application of the law of damages to jobbing overhead
does not lend itself to easy resolution. Our research discloses
that only four cases on this issue have reached the appellate
courts of Ohio. Dayton Power and Light Co. v. Hershner, No. 1101
(2d Dist. Mar. 27, 1981); Dayton Power and Light Co. v.
Puterbaugh, No. 79 CA 13 (2d Dist. Mar* 7, 1980) ; Ohio Power Co.
v. Zemelka (7th Dist. 1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 213, 251 N.E.2d 2;
Warren Telephone Co. v. Hakala (11th Dist. 1957), 105 Ohio App.
459, 152 N.E.2d 718.
The plaintiff in the case sub judice
argues that the Hakala case, supra, stands for the proposition
that indirect
overhead costs can be recovered whenever such
costs have been correctly calculated in accordance with sound
accounting principles and that the Zemelka court, in dicta,
expressly approved such a rule. We, however, do not read these
decisions, or any of those cited above, as adopting a per se rule
with respect to the exclusion or inclusion of overhead as an item
of damage for two reasons.
First, a rule of law does not exist in the abstract.
Therefore, any application of that rule to the facts of another
case must be made in light of the factual setting that gcive rise
to the rule. To this end, we take note of the fact that the
court in Hakala, before holding that indirect costs were
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recoverable, was careful to point out that there was not only
sufficient evidence to prove that the cost of repairs included
direct and indirect costs, but no evidence to refute this proof.
We are quite confident, however, that had there been no proof
that indirect costs had been incurred as a result of the damage,
the Hakala court would not have permitted their recovery
regardless of how those costs had been computed.Thus, the primary
question was and the question before this court is that of
proximate cause, i.e., what indirect or
overhead
costs, if
any, have been incurred because of the defendant's negligence.
The method of calculation is crucial with respect to the amount
of damage suffered, i.e., are the damages merely conjectural
or have they been proved with reasonable certainty. It is only
after proximate causation has been determined in resolution of
the primary question that the method of calculation of the amount
of damages has any pertinency. Thus, the plaintiff's reliance
on its accounting system and the fact that it is imposed upon it
by law is misplaced.
Second, the law of damages is just what its name
implies — a legal concept, not an accounting concept. The two
disciplines are not synonymous and their distinct purposes must
not be confused. With respect to an operation such as that of
the plaintiff or a manufacturer, the purpose of the accountant,
as stated by plaintiff's accounting supervisor, is to take all
the costs of operating a business and distribute them in a fair
and equitable manner to each
job done by the business.
In
furtherance of this purpose, the accountant took all the overhead
(indirect) costs and allocated them to each job in such a way
that no one job bore any greater proportion of the cost than any
other job bore to the total direct costs of all jobs. While the
law is concerned that all the "costs" of all torts committed
against a plaintiff are recovered, the law is not concerned with
whether each tortfeasor bears an equal portion of the total
overhead in relation to the direct costs. To the contrary, the
purpose of the law is to require the tortfeasor to pay only those
costs incurred because of his actions.
Accordingly, the law
requires the tortfeasor to pay for those overhead costs which,
with reasonable diligence by the victim, can be directly
attributed with reasonable certainty to the tortfeasor.
We realize that in some instances it may be difficult
if not impossible to determine to what extent tortious conduct
may have increased costs over and above the cost of every day
operations. This difficulty is well demonstrated in the case at
bar.
The plaintiff would have incurred some costs related to
pole repairs just because of the nature of its business. For
example, the plaintiff would have had to employ a certain number
of persons and maintain a certain number of vehicles and tools
just to replace wornout poles and poles damaged by
acts of
nature. These costs, however, are increased when the plaintiff
has to buy and maintain additional service vehicles or employ
additional help in order to meet the increased demand for pole
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repairs caused by the tortious conduct. Where increased costs
such as these cannot, with reasonable diligence and certainty, be
calculated with respect to each tortfeasor, it is fitting, as
between an innocent party and a wrongdoer, that the wrongdoer be
responsible for a fixed percentage of those costs calculated then
in accordance with sound accounting principles. This will most
often be true with respect to fixed overhead cost such as rent
and property taxes which remain constant over a period of
time.Other costs can be more accurately traced to a particular
defendant with reasonable diligence and in a cost effective
manner. Most often these costs will be variable overhead costs.
At the same timef we recognize that not all variable overhead
costs can be directly traced to a particular defendant. This
would be true, for example, of supply and utility costs.Such
costs may then be charged to the defendant in the same manner as
were fixed overhead costs. In this way the legal concepts as
opposed to the accounting concepts dictate the recovery that is
to be had.
We must now apply these principles to the issue raised
in the case at bar —
proximate cause. The defendant in this
case, unlike his counterpart in Hakala,
brought out on
cross-examination the fact that several of the items of cost
attributed to the defendant's negligence were in reality
attributable to the accounting system used by the plaintiff. The
matter was summarized in the following exchange between the
plaintiff's accounting supervisor and defendant's counsel:
Q.
When you say fairly and equitably, aren't you
really saying that where Mr. Brock's [job] may have be*m less
expensive, somebody else's job may have been more expensive, but
we are averaging them out so that they are fair and equitable to
all?
A. That's correct.
T.p. Vol. II, 48.
This testimony in conjunction with more detailed
testimony concerning the various components of the overhead cost
reflects that the defendant was
charged with a portion of
certain costs that were directly incurred because of other
accidents but not directly incurred because of the defendant's
accident. Such charges are not in conformity with the rule
previously stated that one is liable only for those damages that
directly flow from the injury sustained. This inequity is
demonstrated by the fact that the defendant was charged with a
percentage of the costs incurred by the plaintiff as a result of
overall employee participation in a thrift plan when there was no
evidence to show to what extent, if any, the employees working on
this repair participated in that plan. While, as a matter of
accounting, a portion of the total cost of the plan may be
allocated to each employee, no part of that cost should be
charged to the defendant, as a matter of law, if none of the
employees on this job contributed
to that cost.
It is our
conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that all the

items comprising the jobbing overhead were proximately caused by
the defendant's negligence.
The thrust of our decision today is not that overhead
costs are never recoverable. It is our purpose to point out that
some overhead costs are not attributable to a particular
defendant and cannot be charged to him.The question in each case
to be decided by the trier of fact is: what is the amount of
indirect costs (overhead) which has been proved with reasonable
certainty to have been directly and proximately caused by
defendant's negligence?
Where the actual costs of repair,
including overhead, can be traced directly to a particular
defendant, the law should encourage their revelation rather than
accept an average or close approximation. In this way plaintiff
is more perfectly made whole.
In accordance with our decision as it relates to the
charges for labor and jobbing overhead, the judgment of the trial
court with respect to damages is reversed and the cause is
remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with
this decision.
Judgment appealed from is: Reversed and remanded
PALMER, P.J., and BLACK, J., CONCUR.
FOOTNOTES:
PLEASE NOTE:
The Court has placed of record its
own entry in this case on the date of the
release of this
Opinion.
Messrs. Rich, Pott, Wetherell, Foster & Miller,
Thomas C. Foster, of counsel, 1115 Second National Building, 830
Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, and The Cincinnati Gas &
Electric Company, Legal Department, James R. Mack, of counsel,
P.O. Box 960, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Messrs. Dooley and Heath, James V. Heath, of counsel, 5827 Happy
Hollow, Milford, Ohio 45150, for Defendant-Appellant.
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PHILLIPS, J .
This appeal'comes before the Court ori the solte question of
whether a public utility in a negligence action"txa^f

recover,

a^ a

matter of law, indirect overhead costs as an element of damages
for injury to one of its utility poles,> The court, below held that
it could so recover.

Based upon the record before us, we disagree*

On October 18, 1977, Appellant's automobile, collided with a
utility pole owned' by Appellee-

As na result of the accident,

electric service to Appellee's customers in the ^genertal area surrounding the accident was disrupted.

Appellee promptly dispatched

a crew to repair the damage and rs*&to£e service to its customers.
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I] Subsequently, Appellee filed suit against Appellant for direct and
indirect overhead costs of the repairs.
On August 31* 1978, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgement .

Appellant responded to said motion and after the filing of

supplemental memoranda by both parties, the trial court on November
30/ 1978, granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability but denied same with jcespect to damages. There-J
after, the parties entered into stipulations which effectively
narrowed the question to whether or not Appellee could recover its
indirect costs for the repairs *
On February 12, 1975, the trial court filed its decision and
journal entry finding that Appellee could recover its indirect
[overhead costs.

From this decision, Appellant has perfected an

appeal to this Court.
Appellant's sole assignment of error states:
I

THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THAT OVERHEAD
EXPENSES AND GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES,
THAT IS, ALL INDIRECT COSTS, WERE CHARGEABLE
AS ELEMENTS OF DAMAGE IN A TORT CASE INVOLVING

I

THE DESTRUCTION OF APPELLEE'S UTILITY POLE.
I Numerous lower, court

opinions have been cited

bv both

parties*

Witt

I respect to Ohio cases, the majority of. opinions consist of municipal and county court decisions.

The decisions

are conflicting

with no apparent way to reconcile some of thern^ In addition to
Ohio cases, the parties have cited cases from various jurisdictions
However, in view of the fact that the Ojhto Supreme Court has not
yet addressed itself to the pending question, we do not feel constrained by any of the decisions cited by the parties.

We do note

such cases, however, for whatever guidance they may provide,
jj ~ ™ ~
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The measure of damages for the negligent destruction of a
utility pole is the total replacement cost of thetpole and the
facilities attached thereto, less accrued depreciation of the
damaged pole and attached facilities * 52 0* Jur. 2d, Telegraphs
& Telephones, Section 45; Ohio Power to, v. Huff, 12 Ohio Misc. 214
(Canton Municipal Court 1967); Ohio Power to. V. Zemelka, 19 Ohio
App. 2d 213 (Belmont Co. 1969).

There is/n6 disagreement between

the parties that Appellee's direct costs, that is, labor and
material charges, may be recovered for negligent destruction of
its utility pole.

The sole question before us is whether Appellee

may recover its indirect costs, that is, overhead expenses such
as direct payroll overhead, small tool expense, supervision and
engineering, transportation, store room handling expenses and
general & administrative expenses.
Based upon the fundamental rulers of damages that the injured
party shall have compensation for the injury sustained and that
compensatory damages are intended to make whole the plaintiff for
the wrong done to him,,16 0. Jur. 2d, Damacjesc Section 9, the
lower court found that Appellee was entitled to recover its indirect costs for the repairs, The court's decision and entry
stated:
As indicated by the plaintiff*s'exhibits and as
stipulated by,the defendant, the plaintiff in its
accounting system applys a fixed percentage rate
to its direct and material costs to arrive at
an indirect cost factor.^ The factor consists of,
but not limited 'to, payroll overhead, small tools
expense, supervision in engineering, transportation, administrative and general expense and
storeroom handling charges. Singling out administrative andvgeneral^expense, hereinafter referred
COURT OF APPEALS"
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to as &>& A, we can assume this includes
as^
example; all non-direct labor personnel costs,
telephone costs and even the president's salary.
It is accepted that all of these costs are ongoing and continuing costs of doing business by
any business enterprise*
In defining.overheadlexpenses the.court stated:

I
J
j
I
I

Overhead is a broad category that.is a-cost of
doing business which can notobe divorced from
the cost of the product furnished or of the cost
of operating the business enterprise.** For example f Social Security taxes, unemployment taxes,
fringe benefits in the form of pension plans,
vacation sick pay and other"contractual obligations of.th6"corporation to its employees, and
other types :of continuing business expenses
directly associated with the operation of the
business. It must be pointed out that this
overhead expense continues just as direct labor
continues while the worker is in the employment
of the corporation.
Further:

J
J

j

The third Sategory, G &-A 4GeneraL_Administrative
as defined above) ~ is^ an iteirTwhich again is common
-to all businesses and which is an expense which
must be born in either the end price charged for
the. firm1s products or recovered from any other
source of income to the business•

I
I

Fundamentally then, if a business is to remain in
operation, it-must provide for not only the salaries
or payment of its direct labor employees-and the
material-on^which theycwork but-have the overhead
and administration of these employees m order to
be able to. market its,product and remain competitive
within its industry.

I

If plaintiff, Dayton Power & Light Co., had contracted to have the work done by an outside agency,
the cost.would be readily estimable e.g-, the
contract cost. There is no question that the contract cost would contain for the^benefit of the
contractor overhead, direct labor cost, G & A and
a margin for-profit.
The trial court concluded:

}

Not to reimburse the company-for'the attendant overhead and G & A that is associated with^that direct
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labor would be to not make the plaintiff whole
but to permit him to recover less than that to
which he'was actually damaged.
Since plaintiff in this case has adopted a system
of accounting which is uniform and capable,, of
isolation with cost on each jspecif ic item., the
court would find that in reviewing all -of the
applicable cases cited by the parties that pverhead expenses and general tand 'administrative
expenses are propetly chargeable as elements of
damage; and that the plaintiff- has established
to the degree of certainty necessary that the
direct and indirect expenses involved m the
replacement of the utility poles; and accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the
amount of $450.74 with interest from the date
of this judgment as (sic) the rate of six percent (€%) .

i
j
[
I
!
'
I
'
j
I

It appears that the current greater weight of Ohio authority
on this question does allow recovery of such indirect $ ..overhead
costs.

See: Warren ^Telephone Co. v. Hakala,'lOSjDhio App. 459

(Trumbull County 1957); Ohio Power Co* v. Johnstony 18 Ohio Misc.
55 (Hancock County Common Pleas 1968) ; Ohio Power Co. v. Zemelka
19 Ohio App. 2d 213 (Belmont County 1969).

However, it is also

a fundamental rule that the damages recoverable:
(1) are limited to those injuries or losses
which""are-the natural/ proximate, and probable
consequences of the wrong complained of, (2)
must naturally and proximately flow from the
original wrongful act, and (3) must be shown
with-certainty and' not left' to> speculation or
conjecture. 16 O. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sections
13-15.
Appellee, in its brief, recognizes and does not contest that
the -above statement is a fundamental precept in the law of damages.
Based upon thi£ limitation on damages* we quote with, ^approval the
following language^
Damages -must be -proximate and .cannot be remote or
speculative. There is no logical or legal connection
.COURT OF APP£AtS~
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between the breaking of a wooden power pole by
t&e defendant and salaries <*£ c^xks in oiiic^s ,
superintendents of construction, distribution
superintendents, safety coordinators, general
office accounting personnelt supervisors of transmission and distribution, supervisors jDf labor
relations, etc. The salaries uf these persons
whose salaries are fixed, did not flow from,
nor were they affected by £he negligence of the
defendant. These salaries and .expenses vould
have been paid if the defendant had not broken
the pole and damaged the connected facilities.
Such operating expenses mi#kt be proper in fixing a rate schedule, but w£ do not feel that
they have anything to do w*tk damages to a power
pole.

\

If we try to compute by a percentage, as claimed
by the accountant of the plaintiff, the percentage
would be the same if one, fifty, or no poles were
destroyed, and would not b£ affected by the number
of items charged to the inventory. Fixed income
employees and store expenses are remote matters
from the accident which the defendant had.
Ohio Power Co. v. Huff, 12 Ohio Misc. at 222.

I
]

In the instant: case, Appellee presented jio evidence whatsoever
that these so-called indirect overhead^expenses would not have
been paid, notwithstanding the negligent .actions of Appellant.

No

evidence was presented to show, for example, that due to Appellantfi
negligence,fcxtraemployees had to be called in to work, thereby
necessitating extra payroll taxes, insurance, etc.

In the absence

of evidence that Appellee1s indirect costs were incurred as a
res ult

of Appellant's negligence, Appellee has failed to demonstrate

that the damages it seeks to recover flow directly from and as a
natural, probable and proximate result of the wrong complained of.
Based upon tne record before this Court, we are in full accord with
the statement of Justice-Reynolds in Central Illinois Light Co. v.
Stenzel, 44 111. App. 2d 388 (1963)-

We quote:
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The supervision costs, unless directly connected with the repair of the pole and line,
the store expenses, and the general overhead,
are such expenses that would have been Incurred
and paid, without regard to the breaking of
the pole. They constitute part of the operating expenses >of the plaintiff and this court
can see no relation of these costs to the
negligence of the defendant. In so holding,
this court is cognizant of the complex costs
Of operation of a business such as that of
the plaintiff, but at the same time, this
court cannot see any thread of continuity,
any relation, whatsoever, between the cost
of operation of the plaintiff, and the damages
occasioned by the defendant breaking the pole
of the plaintiff* We think the rule of damages
which requires that the damages must be those
that flow as the natural consequence
of the
negligence of the defendant must not be ignored. In doing so we are not ignoring the
facts of business life, but following the law
of damages•...
44 111. App. 2d at 397-98.
Our decision of the within matter is limited to the facts in j
this particular case and does not mean that a public*utility,may
never recover its indirect overhead expenses as an element of
damages for the negligent destruction of it£ utility pole. We
do not feel, however, that it places an onerous burden upon such
utilities to come forth with evidence to show that such indirect
expenses would-not have been paid but for the negligence of the

{

defendant. All that is required is that the utility prove that the
damages it seeks to recover naturally and proximately flow from
the wrong complained of.

j

Appellant's assignment of error is well taken.
Having found prejudicial error in the record of these proceedings, the decision of the Miami County Municipal Court will
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be reversed and the case remanded for recomputation of the damage
award in a manner consistent with the findings of this Court.

McBRIDE, P.J W

and KERNS/ J., concur.

FINAL ENTRY
The decision of the Jiiami County '.Municipal Court is hereby
reversed and the case remanded for 'further ^proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

/ \PRESIDING JUDGE

Copies mailed to:
Curtis E. Mclntyre
Arthur A. Ames
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